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PREFACE 
The American press has an obligation to provide the pub-
lic with information about foreign policy decisions. Tradi-
tionally, journalists also offer editorial comment concerning 
policy developments. The purpose of this research has been 
to examine the significance of the press as an influence in 
foreign policy decisions. U.S. foreign policy regarding 
China during the 1930s and 1940s has been used as a case study 
because American journalists did try to influence policy 
during that period. The study has been enlightening in terms 
of providing an illustration of the impact of journalists on 
policy during an emotional political debate. 
The Oklahoma State University Political Science Department 
has been most supportive of my work during the course of this 
study. I wish especially to thank Professor Harold V. Sare 
for the encouragement and advice I so needed, and for sharing 
his expertise on the Far East with me. Thanks also to Dr. 
William M. Randle, Jr., of Phillips University's Language and 
Communications Department, for starting me off in an exciting 
new direction in life. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Louis Wirth said in 1947, following the Hitler years, 
that "We live in an era when control over the media consti-
tutes perhaps the most important source of power in the 
social universe." 1 A 1976 UNESCO press study analyzing the 
positive and negative political effects of cross-cultural 
broadcasting, states: 
At the heart of the debate is the realization 
that communication is power and that control 
over the mechanisms and content of a nation's 
communication system enables vested interests, 
be they public or private, to control certain 
aspects of a ·society's decision-making appara-
tu~ as well as the cultural and political sym-bols that bind a particular society together.2 
Most twentieth century revolutionaries appear to agree 
that in order to control a population, it is necessary to 
control the media. A standard first step in a modern revo-
lution is to take over the media. In ongoing authoritarian 
regimes, the media becomes a vital tool used in maintaining 
the status quo. In the Information Age, careful use of the 
media by any government is crucial throughout its stages of 
development. According to this view, to control information 
is to control society. If this is true, then theoretically 
modern totalitarianism might not have been possible without 
1 
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the development of mass communications technology. 
While most analysts agree that some sort of relationship 
exises between politics and the press, there is considerable 
disagreement concerning the significance of that relation-
ship. Opinions range from those who agree that the impact is 
direct and crucial, to those who claim the impact is minimal. 
The varied and often contradictory opinions are based· on mas-
sive research into how media effects society generally and 
politics specifically. So abundant is the research that one 
of the researchers, Joseph T. Klapper, wrote in 1960 that: 
The literature has reached that stage of profu-
sion and disarray, characteristic of all·proli-
ferating disciplines, at which researchers and 
research administrators speak wistfully of es-
tablishing centers where the accumulating data 
might be sifted and stored. The field has 
grown to the point at which its practitioners 
are periodically asked by other researchers to 
attempt to assess, in short, "what we know 
about the effects of mass communication."3 
Klapper views with sympathy the assessment of fellow 
media analyst Bernard Berelson, whose "moody conclusion" in 
1948 was that: 
• • • some kinds of communication on some kinds 
of issues, brought to the attention of some 
kinds of people under some kinds of conditions, 
have some kinds of effects.4 
Klapper himself is more optimistic, proposing that "we 
already know a good deal more about communication than we 
thought we did, and are on the verge of being able to pro-
ceed toward more abundant and more fruitful knowledge." 5 
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Klapper's classic research based on more than 1,000 studies 
between 1930 and 1960 brought him to the conclusion that the 
sociological effects of the media are minimal. He does sug-
. gest that some generalizations can be made as a result of 
research analysis. He believes, for example, that media 
tends to reinforce, rather than to change opinions in a free 
market society (where media reflects mass tastes) • Opinion 
leaders expose themselves to media more, and influence the 
masses more than media does directly. The media, he 
believes, does influence opinion development on new issues, 
where no opinion previously existed. Personal influence is 
often more crucial than media influence when both are present, 
in Klapper's view. One-sided presentations are most effective 
in persuading less educated audiences. Repetition is some-
times effective, he says, except when it is overdone and 
blatant~y propagandistic. 6 
In the 1960s research into the political effects of mod-
ern communications technology continued apace, with major con-
tributions emerging from such notable researchers as Daniel 
Lerner, Samuel Huntington, Karl Deutsch, Lucian Pye, Wilbur 
Schramm, Ithiel de Sola Pool and others. Their conclusions 
were by no means unanimous. 
Karl Deutsch wrote in 1963 that "It might be profitable to 
look upon government somewhat less as a problem of power and 
somewhat more as a problem of steering ••• and steering (in 
the political world) is decisively a ma:tter of communication."? 
Huntington and Lerner suggested that "the revolution of ris-
ing frustrations, can be attributed in many cases to modern 
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mass communications systems. A population, they implied, can 
have its human rights ignored or violated by a government and 
the people will not revolt unless they are made to perceive 
that their situation is not normal and that there are ways to 
change it. Perceptions of inadequacy in government in the 
twentieth century are linked, these analysts say, with the 
d . 8 mass me ~a. 
Schramm and Lerner refer to communications as: 
a kind of temperature-controlling agent that can 
raise the social temperature, for example, by 
raising expectations when the developing economy 
is not ready to satisfy them. It can also reduce 
temperature by providing explanation, holding out 
-reward, speeding up development, promoting change 
• • • and above all by making the people· as well 
as the leaders heard.9 
Lerner suggests that "mass communications serves as 'the great 
multiplier' in development, the device that can spread the new 
ideas, attitudes and knowledge more rapidly than ever before."10 
Frederick Frey points out, however, that.while media can 
be a stimulant it can also be a sedative. It can arouse feel-
ings of frustrated expectations, but it can also provide people 
with an escape from reality •••. a retreat into fantasyland. 11 
This view implies that a government might effectively protect 
itself from mass political dissent by giving every citizen a 
color television set. Frey noted in 1966 that the evidence as 
he saw it in developing nations showed that the phenomenon of 
rising frustrations existed among the elites, not among the 
masses, and that the elites' frustrations could not be attri-
b t d 1 . 1 . d d . t" 12 u e exc us~ve y to expan e commun~ca ~ons. 
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Walter Lippmann agrees that the media plays a role in 
development generally, but he, too, refuses to place the blame 
for socio-political problems or credit for solutions solely on 
the shoulders of the media. He describes the press as: 
• • • the beam of a searchlight that moves rest-
lessly about, bringing one episode and then another 
out of darkness into vision. Men cannot do the 
work of the world by this light alone. They cannot 
govern society by episodes, incidents, and erup-
. tions. It is only when they work by a steady light 
of their own, that the press, when it is turned 
upon them, reveals a situation intelligible enough 
for a popular decision.l3 
Lippmann concludes that it is because governments (as 
well as schools, churches and newspapers) must make decisions 
based on limited information that they fail to make wise 
decisions in problem solving. Lippmann agrees, too, with 
Frey, that "a preference for the curious trivial as against 
the dull important, and the hunger for sideshows and three-
legged calves" 14 is a primary human defect that effects good 
government. 
In Lippmann's view, "The trouble lies deeper than the 
press, and so does the remedy." 15 The problem lies in our 
society's whole system of gathering information and making 
decisions and delegating responsibility. All too often, 
Lippmann laments, the decision-making process looks like 
"the mere collisions of the blind." 16 In his opinion: 
The troubles of the press, like the troubles of 
representative government, be it territorial or 
functional, like the troubles of industry, be it 
capitalist, cooperative or communist, go back to 
a common source: to the failure of self-governing 
people to transcend their casual experience and 
their prejudice, by inventing, creating, and 
organizing a machinery of knowledge.l7 
One of the problems in today's world of complicated 
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politics and complicated communications systems is the prob-
lem of transmitting accurate, unbiased information from the 
source to the public via the press. Harold Laski, in his 
introduction to Robert Desmpnd's 1937 book, The Press and 
World Affairs, discusses how hard it is for the public to 
learn the truth about foreign affairs from "free press" 
journalists. He outlines four points that need to be under-
stood by the average newspaper reader: 
1. That there is no government in the world 
not engaged in "weighting".the news in its own 
interest; 
2. That there are many news-gathering organiza-
tions, some of which add their own bias to what 
they report; 
3. That correspondents have what Mr. Justice 
Holmes called their "inarticulate major prem-
ises" which necessarily color the reports they 
send; and 
4. That the editorial offices have also their 
own special values to contribute to the work of 
selection and presentation of news.l8 
Laski was positive in his assessment of efforts by post 
World War I journalists to keep the public honestly informed, 
but his judgment of "the immense machinery" controlling those 
journalists, i.e., the powerful news services (and the likes 
of W. R. Hearst) was damning: II the problem of the 
foreign news service," he wrote, "lies at the heart of the 
major problems of the modern state." He concludes that: 
The press, in a sentence, is a fundamental weapon in the social conflict, national and international, in which we are all, despite ourselves, combatants. 
We shall have truthful news when untruthful news does not pay, but it will not pay only when the 
major causes of social conflict, national and inter-
national, have been removed.l9 
Until that happy day, the assumption is that although 
journalists may attempt to report the news honestly, their 
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governments, publishers, or other powerful interest groups or 
individuals, will limit the public's access to straight, 
unbiased news. And then, of course, there is the problem of 
getting the public to care one way or another. 
While apathy can be viewed as a problem, extremism is 
often a more critical one, and in the twentieth century extrem-
ism is a major concern in international relations. Many ana-
lysts agree that nationalism is perhaps one of the strongest 
forces affecting international relations today. It is an issue 
that can rouse otherwise apathetic people into action. The 
political, ethnic and religious forces that combine to create 
nationalistic ferver have contributed to revolutionary tenden-
cies in many developing nations. While these forces might not 
be brand new forces in the world, we now see and hear about 
them more clearly and more often through the modern media. 
The impact is stronger; factions can attract more adherents and 
more enemies more readily than before. So while communications 
technology has the potential for aiding in unification, per-
ceived fanaticism can lead to greater fragmentation, and to com-
plications in the establishment of positive relations among and 
within nations. 
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When a new regime assumes leadership in a new country, 
one of its tasks is to win the allegiance of its own people 
and the respect of other nations. The press is usually used 
in that endeavor, especially in nations where the press in 
controlled by the state, but also in nations where the press 
is supposedly "free." A leader who understands the psycholo.gy 
of communication and motivation can reap valuable benefits 
from a well-managed mass media system when the nation is new 
and citizens are impressionable, and when observers are form-
ing first-impression opinions of the country. 
While modern communications technology may have made it 
easier for totalitarian governments to develop, then, the same 
technology has made it more difficult, according to some ana-
lysts, for democratic governments to function efficiently. 
This is said to be especially true in the case of military 
endeavors. Numerous problems between the military and the 
media are cited to substantiate this assessment. Korea and 
Vietnam were examples of the problem; u.s. involvement in 
Central America and in the Hid-East offer further evidence. 
A most recent example was Grenada, where the media had 
extremely limited access to information about what was going 
on there. The media's expectation of access to military 
information, then, can create real problems in a democratic 
system. From the media's viewpoint, the problem is knowing 
where the law draws the line between public access rights 
and national security needs; between the public's right to 
know (through the media) and the military's right to withhold 
information that would threaten national security. 
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In a world plagued by extreme right-wing authoritarian 
governments on one hand and left-wing totalitarians on the 
other, it is crucial that u.s. foreign policy decisions con-
cerning those countries are based on information that is as 
accurate and unbiased as possible. Similarities between the 
two wings can make it hard to tell which is which, and then, 
which is worse. Distinguishing between them and deciding who 
to support is a major challenge for foreign policy decision 
makers in a free world. Furthermore, u.s. citizens get their 
information from a variety of news sources that have their 
own biases. This makes it difficult to know which policies 
they should encourage their representatives to suppo~t. 
Western leaders must often wish that moderation were more 
common among new emerging nations and that revolutions in 
older cultures would more often be won by middle-of-the road 
regimes instead of by extremists. Unfortunately, new nations 
often emerge out of extreme oppression, and therefore tend 
toward extreme solutions to problems. When extremist tenden-
cies combine with administrative inexperience, multiple prob-
lems can result in a young nation. If assistance in solving 
those problems is sought from outside sources, those "out-
siders" must make foreign policy decisions concerning the pros 
and cons of giving aid of one sort or another to that particu-
lar nation at that particular time. 
Keeping track of and comprehending the dramatic changes 
occurring during the first half of the twentieth century had 
to be a challenge for both politicians and journalists. As 
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communications technology was rapidly developing and the 
ability of the media to report on world events was improving, 
international relations were becoming more and more complex. 
While the old colonialism was corning to an end in India and 
Africa, and ancient empires were dying in the Orient and in 
East Europe, a new kind of imperialism was threatening both 
Eastern and Western hemispheres, and revolution was becoming 
commonplace in small and large nations in the northern and 
southern hemispheres. 
Is there a connection between the two phenomena? Has 
modern communications technology contributed to the rise of 
revolution and other international problems? Does the media 
act as a stimulus to political activism, or does it function 
as a narcotic that keeps the public preoccupied and sedated 
in a fantasyland, while in the real world politicians go 
about their business? Do journalists influence political 
decision making, in effect sharing responsibility in the 
establishment of foreign policy? These are the questions to 
be explored in this research. 
It is the thesis of this paper that the media can and 
often does play a crucial role in a nation's development 
both internally and externally. That is to say, it helps 
disseminate information to citizens and leaders inside the 
country as well as outside, and can help create either good 
will or ill will, again both internally and externally. 
The impact of the media is probably much greater when a 
nation is new, or is under new leadership. This is true 
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concerning both citizens within the nation and foreign observ-
ers. As a new nation matures, the media is likely to become 
less powerful as a generator of opinions. Or, in an estab-
lished culture, the media will have an impact in establishing 
opinions on an issue when that issue is new. It will have a 
greater impact upon the less educated than on the better edu-
cated. In other words, the press does have power, but it is 
a limited power. 
The case to be studied will be u.s.-china relations and 
development of u.s. foreign policy toward China during the 
1930s and 1940s. The work of American journalists who actually 
lived and worked in China and who wrote both articles and books 
will be studied, and an evaluation made concerning what kind of 
impact their work had on foreign policy decisions concerning 
the u.s. and China. Journalists to be studied will include 
Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Edgar and Helen Foster Snow, 
and Theodore White. In addition to examining the influence of 
these American journalists on American decisions concerning 
China, the way in which Chinese leaders responded to and used 
American journalists will also be investigated. 
By studying the interaction between journalists and politi-
cal leaders in China and the u.s., it is hoped that some contri-
bution will be made toward an improved understanding of the 
impact of media on one aspect of political life, namely, foreign 
policy. The China-u.s. situation during the period in question 
provides an interesting case study, for some of the journalists, 
who saw first hand what was going on in China, did try very hard 
to influence u.s. policy toward China. Not only did they fail 
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to persuade key decision makers to follow their advice, they 
were later castigated for their views. Further, there is now 
some question concerning whether it might not have been wiser 
to follow their advice. The consensus among most analysts 
seems to be that u.s. foreign policy during this period con-
cerning this part of the world is a good example of bad policy. 
It·will be the purpose of this research to examine the extent 
to which the media contributed to that state of affairs. 
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CHAPTER II 
U.S. PRINT JOURNALISTS IN CHINA 
At the end of World War II, H. L. Mencken, himself a jour-
nalist, referred to journalists who had covered the war as 
"typewriter statesmen" who had all too willingly succumbed to 
the military establishment's req~est for voluntary media self-
censorship of certain war news. Most journalists, he claimed, 
wrote either irrelevant, sentimental human interest war 
features, or they wrote biased war stories meant to be "accept-
able" rather than factual. In Mencken's view, historians 
would find very little of value in the news reports of the 
1 
war. 
Mencken's cynicism concerning coverage of the war was by 
no means unanimous. Other analysts considered that World War II 
was the most thoroughly and accurately reported war in history. 
Others, inspired by the McCarthy-led ruckus over the politics 
of wartime journalists, claimed many of them were Communists or 
Communist sympathizers. Some analysts think that the whole 
question concerning the attitude of the press had little sig-
nificance since their impact on the political process was insig-
nificant. 
The crux of_ the matter does appear to be whether journal-
ists wield enough power for the question to matter at all. Was 
the press influential enough in the development of U.S. foreign 
14 
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policy toward China to warrant concern? McCarthy answered in 
the affirmative and clearly felt the question was of great 
concern. Others felt McCarthianism itself was the greater 
threat. 
Edgar and Helen Foster Snow, Agnes Semdley, Anna Louise 
Strong and Theodore White were among the American journalists 
who cared a great deal about their country's foreign policy 
toward China. They made their concern evident in their books 
and articles, which were based on first-hand, on-site observa-
tions among the revolutionaries. Imperialist China had neglec-
ted the welfare, freedom and security of the population. 
These journalists perceived that the KMT were being unsuccess-
ful in correcting those problems and that the Maoists appeared 
to be on the right track. The Snows, Smedley, Strong, White 
and others wrote about the corruption of the KMT and the good 
work of the CCP. They were conside~ed by some of their con-
temporaries and by some historians to be either naive or know-
ing conspirators with the Communists. 
In addition to writing stories home about their impres-
sions, these journalists also attempted to sway political 
leaders as foreign policy decisions were made concerning China. 
Anna Louise Strong, for example, visited Harry Dexter White, 
then Assistant u.s. Treasurer, and Eleanor Roosevelt, to dis-
cuss a pending loan to Chiang Kai-shek in the earlyl940s. -The 
visit is reported to have been successful in reducing that loan 
and in limiting its usefulness as military money. 2 
Agnes Smedley was known as a passionate supporter of the 
Chinese Communist cause.· Although she said she never joined 
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the Communist Party, because she disdained dogma, she was an 
overt supporter. Her books and articles urged u.s. support 
for Mao Tse-tung and documented the atrocities of the KMT. 
Edgar Snow was the American journalist best. known for 
his expertise on China. His classic Red Star Over China was 
the first significant American documentation of developments 
in China during the early years when the Communists were on 
the rise. Few among reviewers criticized that book negatively, 
but some did criticize his later books and articles as danger-
ously naive about the real purposes of the Chinese Communists. 
During the 1940s and 1950s Snow continued to write favorably 
about the CCP and unfavorably about the KMT. 
On the other side were media moguls such as w. R. Hearst 
and Henry· Luce who avidly supported Chiang Kai-shek and the 
KMT, and who wrote horror stories about the CCP. These men 
were not just journalists, however. They were extremely 
wealthy and influential businessmen heavily involved in the 
political economics of u.s.-china relationships. 
In spite of u.s. support for the KMT, the CCP succeeded 
in pushing the KMT off the mainland into Taiwan. Americans 
who had sided with the KMT blamed the defeat on U.S. diplomats 
and journalists who had argued against a stronger U.S. commit-
ment to the Nationalists. Many of those "sympathizers" were 
condemned and·punished under Senator Joseph McCarthy's leader-
ship in the 1950s. 
While American journalists are no longer being brought to 
trial for political bias in their reporting, the question of 
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the power of the press is still a critical one. The public is 
often wary of press bias and political leaders are still sus-
picious about the intentions of journalists • • • especially 
"investigative" ones. Only journalists themselves seem to con-
sider that they are the link between public officials and the 
public. For the rest, journalists still tend to become scape-
goats when policies fail or when the news is negative. It 
happened concerning China during the first half of this century; 
it continues to happen on occasion today. 
Hans Morgenthau wrote in his 1963 forward to Tang Tsou's 
America's Failure in China, 1941-1950, that "The communization 
of China has indeed been the greatest single defeat the foreign 
policy of the u.s. has suffered." 3 Ever since that defeat in 
1949, much has been written about how the u.s. "lost" China. 
Morgenthau reminds us, however, that China never was ours to 
lose, and he points out that the tendency to be unrealistic and 
possessive in foreign policy thinking can be dangerous. It was 
our failure to realistically assess the situation in China dur-
ing the 1930s and 1940s that led to our defeat there, in Morgen-
thau' s view. 
"Pernicious myths" and certain "national characteristics" 
were involved in our China failure, according to Morgenthau. 
He discusses the neurotic and psychotic symptoms that were evi-
dence of our frantic effort to maintain the myth that China 
somehow belonged to America and was "lost" as a result of a 
Communist conspiracy. He praises Tang's work for revealing: 
• • • the strands of American policy which led to 
the communization of China and its emergence as a great power. What is revealed is something which is not peculiar to our China policy but has been characteristic of many of our other foreign poli-cies as well: The simultaneous pursuit of con-tradictory policies and the commitment to ends which could not be achieved with the means em-ployed. The defects of our China policy reveal a style of foreign policy whose roots are embedded in the character of the nation.4 
18 
Naivete is a major part of that American "character" that 
led to disaster in China, in Tang's view. In 1963 his assess-
ment was that: 
One could hardly find a more sobering example of the tragic results produced by a policy of good intentions and high idea~s which lacked the foun-dation of a correlative estimate of self-interest and which was not supported by military power equal to the noble tasks.S 
Both American citizens and decision-makers, according to 
Tang, were extremely naive about both Communism and democracy 
during the years in question. He examines the problem as it 
is reflected in the work of writers such as Edgar Snow, Owen 
Lattimore, Freda Utley (before her conversion), Gunther Stein, 
Walter Judd and Lawrence Rosinger. While he concludes that 
these writers are not to be blamed for the China debacle, 
because they are simply reflections of the American national 
character, he does see a link between their books and articles 
and American foreign policy decisions. Some writers, he 
claims, "failed to discharge their function of providing intel-
lectual leadership." 6 Although Red Star Over China was exempted 
from Tang's criticism, he does cite Edgar Snow as one of those 
failing to provide that kind of leadership. Citing two Snow 
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articles in the SaturdayEvening Post ("Sixty Million Lost 
Allies," June 10, 1944, and "Must China Go Red?", May 12, 
1945}, Tang describes Snow's view of the Chinese Communists 
as reflecting "the increasing confusion in the u.s. over the 
nature of Chinese Communism." 7 According to Tang's iriterpre-
tation, Snow believed the Chinese Communists were not "really 
Communists," and finds Snow both confused and contradictory 
on the issue of Chinese-Russian ties. 
Tang also uses the writing of Freda Utley in 1939 to 
illustrate the climate of opinion in the U.S. at the time, 
which influenced the perceptions of even those who later 
became the "staunchest advocates of the Nationalist cause." 8 
Tang evaluates Utley as one of those who should have been 
least likely to succumb to naive thinking: 
If any Western observer in China could have detected the true nature of the Chinese Com-
munist movement at the time, such a person 
would have been Freda Utley. She had been a 
member of the British Communist Party, married 
a Russian citizen, lived for six years in Mos-
cow, worked in a research agency of the Soviet government, and had become completely disil-lusioned with Communism.9 
Before her disillusionment, her 1939 book, China at War, 
reflected the wishful thinking of American "innocents abroad." 
She was one of the many journalists during the period who 
referred to the Chinese Communist Party as "a party of social 
reformers and patriots" and Chinese Communism as "a movement 
of peasant emancipation." 10 
It is interesting to note that Tang makes only one brief, 
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unanalyzed reference to the pro-Nationalist press exemplified 
by Henry Luce and his Time-Life-Fortune magazine. Luce is 
referred to as "a China-born son of a missionary whose influ-
ence on China policy was by no means negligible." No evalua-
tion is made.concerning Luce as a reflector of American atti-
tudes or of Luce as an influence on American China policy. 
Arch Steele, referred to by John Maxwell Hami.lton in the 
January 1982 edition of The Quill .as "generally regarded as 
one of the most objective reporters in China at the time 
(1930s)," 11 points out that very little was known about the 
struggle between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Com-
munists until Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China was published 
in 193·8.. Steele is quoted as. saying: 
The propaganda was provided by the Nationalists on the one hand, who painted the Communists as bandits and murderers who ate. their children for breakfast, and, on the other, by Communist apoligists {like Agnes Smedley and Anna Louise Strong) who painted them as saints.l2 
Not only did the book influence how Westerners viewed the 
Chinese Communists, the Chinese~language edition of.Red Star 
helped shape how the Chinese viewed Mao and the Communists. 
Harvard Professor John K. Fairbank is quoted in the article 
as saying that '~considered in its effect on world history, 
Red Star is the most important of all historical studies on 
modern China." 13 
A review of the literature on China during the 1930s and 
1940s confirms the dearth of objective reporting. The KMT/ 
CCP controversy became so heated that it was difficult for any 
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journalist to maintain objectivity. Developments in Yenan 
sounded too good; the situation in Nanking sounded too bad. 
American reporter Jack Belden, who had been in China 
in the 1930s, then left to return in the late 1940s, went 
into the CCP headquarters in Yenan to observe developments 
there. When he returned to Nanking, convinced that the 
revolution being led from Yenan was "the decisive factor in 
the war," 14 it was difficult to convince his fellow journal-
ists or military or diplomatic personnel that anything of 
significance was happening there. No one at that time was 
ready to believe that the Communists were capable of carrying 
on any kind of military effort in North China. Belden finally 
concluded that the journalists were simply afraid to get in-
volved in the issue. "Consciously and unconsciously,· some of 
these men were afraid of becoming tainted with a politically 
pink tinge." 15 One reporter told Belden: 
You've been away so long, you don't know what it's like in the States. You either is (a Red) 
or you isn't. What you tell me may all be true, but I'm not going to report it.l6 
Belden was to find the warning to be sound. He sent two 
articles about the Communists to an American magazine and they 
were initially bought by the magazine with high praise for 
their quality. However the McCarthy "hysteria" then ensued, 
and the publisher cancelled the articles, criticizing Belden 
as identifying himself with "mob violence." 17 
Belden goes on to describe the connection between. American 
partisan politics and the conflict between CCP and KMT 
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supporters. Belden's view is that the Republican party, under 
the influence of both the publishing group headed by Henry 
Luce, and the Scripps-Howard newspapers, used the situation to 
attack the democratic administration. These powerful men, 
Belden says, got together w~th Chiang Kai-shek to use the 
threat of Russian intervention in the Chinese revolution as a 
scapegoat technique. Their ploy was to tell the public that 
the problem in China was the result not of Chiang's corrupt 
or inefficient regime, but was caused by Russian interference. 
The method was an attempt not only to cover up Chiang's prob-
lems, but to convince the American Congress that American dol-
lars were needed to help Chiang fight the Russian/Chinese 
Communist conspiracy. 
The ploy was effective, according to Belden. The foreign 
correspondents in China "formed a very ineffective force in 
getting the facts about the Far East home to the American pub-
lic," in his view. 18 Henry Luce's Time and Life magazines, 
"while often disregarding their own correspondents' dispatches, 
demanded aid to Chiang." 17 Former American Ambassador to Mos-
cow William c. Bullitt, a foreign policy spokesman for the 
Republican party, was placed in China as Life magazine corre-
spondent, but in reality led a formidable pro-Chiang p~opaganda 
war. The situation, Belden remarks, made it "difficult for any 
correspondent to point out the major reasons why Chiang Kai-
shek was being defea~ed." 20 
In his 1979 book,· The United States and China in the Twen-
tieth Century, Michael Schaller discusses the "uninformed-
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misinformed" issue as it affected American leadership. He 
pictures President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a man who, "like 
many men, desired reality to conform to his plan for it." 21 
Following the failure of a coalition government to develop 
between the Communists and Nationalists, Roosevelt's plan 
was to win the war against Japan by supporting Chiang Kai-shek. 
Unfortunately, Schaller says, "FDR never fully realized that 
in his effort to forge a new order in China he had allied 
America to a decaying government .• Schaller agrees 
with Belden that FDR's illusions were vividly illustrated and 
reinforced by the Henry Luce publishing empire which avidly 
supported Chiang, placing him and his wife on six Time and 
Life covers. in 1945. At the same time, however, increasing 
numbers of Americans in China were reporting on the reality 
of what was going on in China. Schaller points out that 
while "literally thousands of reports from journalists, dip-
lomats and military officers" tried to persuade Roosevelt to 
change his course, the president and his advisors had become 
"prisoners of their own ignorance and optimism." They had 
set their course and had become "unable or unwilling to alter 
that course." 23 
It is Schaller's view that only by disregarding the 
"inspired" news stories from the White House and the Time 
covers of Chiang and his wife could one discover "the tragedy 
of wartime China." 24 Schaller uses the work of Theodore White 
as an example of the kind of realistic reporting coming out of 
China that. was basically ignored. by the American public and 
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American decision makers. Our political leaders continued to 
believe in and support an image they had helped to create 
• • • an image of the KMT that Schaller claims had no basis 
in reality. The reality as pictured by on-site observers was 
a KMT "Lacking virtually all principles save for anticommunism 
and a dedication to greed." 25 
Schaller points out that when the u.s. joined the war 
against Japan in 1941, there had been little contact between 
American officials and the Chinese Communists. He refers to 
the handful of American journalists and adventurers such as 
Snow, T. A. Bisson, Agnew Smedley, Evans Carlson and Anna 
Louise Strong, who had.journeyed to Communist territory and 
written favorable reports on what they saw. But such reports 
had little impact on mass opinion or government policy, in 
Schaller's view. 
Schaller describes the 1944 Dixie Mission into Yenan and 
the glowing reports about the Communists in the North China 
headquarters. He discusses the positive response expressed 
by journalists, diplomats and military observers concerning 
the work of the Communists. Then he analyzes the story of 
Patrick.Hurley, Roosevelt's· Ambassador. to China, who per-
suaded the .President to follow his advice instead of everyone 
else's. Hurley's mission to help create a coalition govern-
ment in China had failed, whereupon Hurley advised Roosevelt 
to support the KMT because the Communists, in his view, were 
simply not a significant entity. That kind of response to 
the China situation illustrates the kind of inaccurate 
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perception that Schaller, Tang, Morgenthau and others blame on 
American naivete and ignorance concerning China, Communism and 
democracy during the period. 
Anthony Kubek refutes the view that American journalist 
had little impact on u.s. policy toward China. He claims in 
his 1963 book, How the Far East Was Lost: -American Policy and 
the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949, that those journal-
ists who were sympathetic toward the Chinese Communists played 
24 a major role in the CCP's good reputation in the U.S. Kubek, 
however, is unsympathetic in his response to these writers. 
He does not call them naive; he describes them as part of a 
conscious propaganda effort on the part of Russian, Chinese 
and American Communists or Communist sympathizers. He cites a 
report from the American Embassy.in China dated January 23, 
1941, concerning the positive relations between the Chinese 
Communists and the press: 
The Department will, of course, be aware that the Chinese Communists have hi.therto had and still 
appear to ·have a good press abroad. They have 
exercised much subtlety and skill in their rela-
tions with foreign press correspondents, especi-
ally Americans.27 
In his report to the State Department, the Ambassador (Johnson} 
points especially to Edgar Snow as: 
Perhaps the one American.who has done more than any 
other to portray and to explain the Chinese Commun-ists and their principles and objectives in a favor-
able light.28 
Other journalists who, in Kubek's words, "colorfully 
26 
dramatized" the CCP and made them known in a positive way to 
millions of Americans and Europeans, included Randall Gould, 
Anna Louise Strong, Agnes Smedley, and Major E. F. Carlson, 
who "perseveringly and sympathetically explained the role 
that the Communists have played and continue to play in China": 
It seems not unlikely that the favorable foreign press which the Chinese Communists enjoy is 
ascribable to a variety of. reasons: the Commun-ists encourage contact; they utilize propaganda 
skillfully;· they are adept in seeing that their. 
versions of incidents and problems are promptly placed before correspondents and other third-power nationals of consequence. Moreover they 
are in a sense the "underdog;" as the chief 
opposition party they are often recipients of 
sympathy. They a~e poor, young, enthusiastic. More important, they have a def.ini te program 
and they are adroit in describing it.29 
Kubek also quotes John P. Davies, Jr., who disagreed with 
the Ambassador's assessment. It was Davies' opinion that the 
Nationalists lacked foreign advocates "because of such larger 
factors as the obvious failings of and corruption within the 
Central Government and the crusading appeal of the Communist 
movement." 
Kubek labels the l.arge number of pro-CCP books as a "cam-
paign unequalled in history" sponsored by Kremlin agents to 
spread lies about Chiang Kai-shek. Not only did the campaign 
produce a "bumper crop of books on China and the Far East" 
that pictured the Reds in a favorable light, but they were 
also then reviewed by what Kubek labels "Communist sympathi-
zers." Writer owen Lattimore was one of those sympathetic 
reviewers named "architect of our Far Eastern policy" by 
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Senator Joseph McCarthy. Kubek disagrees with the "architect" 
label but does call him "at the very least its (the CCP's 
chief propagandist." 30 
Other journalists/writers blamed for "the loss of China" 
by Kubek include Gunther Stein, Harrison Forman, Theodore 
White, Annalee Jacoby, and John Fairbank. Says Kubek: 
The tally is alsmot endless • • • The record shows 
that numerous authors deluded the American people 
about China from 1937 to 1950. Books on the Far 
East became among the most effective avenues for 
insidious propaganda which affected our attitude 
toward the Nationalist Chinese in favor of the 
Reds. The book reviewer then played a signifi~ 
cant role because he stood between the public and 
the publisher's products. • •• These books col-
ored the news and opinions in the American press 
and in pulpits, classrooms, and political organ-
izations all over the country. The general theme 
was that the Chinese Communists were not real 
Communists but mere."agrarian reformers" inde-
pendent of Moscow.31 · 
In his chapter on Communist sympathizers in the State 
Department, Kubek refers to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau's 
diaries which include reference to Anna Louise Strong. He 
tells about Strong's trip from Yenan to ~vashington for 
interviews with Eleanor Roosevelt and Assistant Treasury 
Department Secretary Harry Dexter White in an effort to break 
up a then-pending u.s. loan to Chiang. According to this 
story,·as a result of-the meeting White did cut the amount of 
the loan by 40 percent and surrounded the remaining 60 percent 
with conditions making it virtually useless. 32 
One of the strongest apologists for everything Communists, 
Kubek says, was Agnes Smedley, whose book Battle Hymn of China 
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compares the Nationalists with the Nazis, while the Communists 
are eulogized. Kubek reports that Smedley was accused by 
Major General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's intellig~nce 
chief, as being a member of the celebrated Sorge spy ring. 
The Army later offered a retraction, saying it had no proof 
Smedley was a member of the spy ring. Kubek calls this 
"another puzzling chapter in our China policy." He also 
points out that Smedley left her estate to the Communist mili-
tary leader, Chu Teh, and asked that her ashes be buried in 
Peiping. She was buried there, along with Anna Louise Strong, 
the only foreigners to be buried in the equivalent of Arneri-
33 ca's Arlington Cemetery. 
Kubek concludes that: 
As one looks backwards at China now from the tragi-
cally clear perspective of hindsight, it is 
apparent that the battle of books was won by the 
anti-Nationalists through their power and influence. 
The American people had no real knowledge of China. 
The Communist sympathizers filled the vacuum with 
their own books, reviewed favorably by each other. 
They derided and denounced all others who had a 
kind word to say for the Nationalist government~ 
These people were able to exercise an incredibly 
effective censorship over what the American people 
should read, know and think about Far Eastern 
affairs·. 34 
Kubek does not draw a line between the power of that pro-CCP 
press and the decision of the Roosevelt Administration to 
ignore it. His position is that even though the U.S. gave no 
aid to the CCP and did aid the KMT, we would have given more 
help to the KMT had it notbeen for the good press the CCP 
had from its American sympathizers. Kubek, reflecting 
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post-war "China Lobby" thinking, would have voted for unlimited 
u.s. financial and military aid to the KMT. He also would have 
denied that corruption had anything to do with the KMT's need 
and' desire for that aid. 
While Edgar Snow has. gone down in history as one of those 
writers who really did seem to influence to some extent what 
happened in China, his first wife, Helen Foster Snow, received 
little press attention. In her 1984 book, My China Years, she 
discusses what she clearly considers her own quite significant 
role in the successful development of Chinese Communism and in 
the development of rapport between the CCP and at least some 
American journalists, military observers and diplomats. 35 She 
and Edgar were the primary instigators of the student movement 
in China, she claims, a movement which was indeed crucial to 
the successful struggle by the Communists against the Chiang 
regime. Ms. Snow's story is that she and her husband were 
both extremely influential not just as journalists but as 
actual instigators of that student movement. 
Ms. Snow, who wrote under the pseudonym Nym Wales, 
describes .the development of the student movement as resulting 
from the KMT policy of repression, imprisonment, torture and 
slaughter of young people who .sympathized with the Communists. 
A group of students drew up a petition, early in the movement, 
outlining their grievances. They bought the petition to the 
Snows to be translated and published in the foreign press. 
Ms. Snow took the manuscript.to Reuters for publishing. She 
and Edgar considered the document crucial news about developing 
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antagonism between the children of Nanking officials, their 
parents and Chiang's government. The students were taking 
serious risks in putting their thoughts onto paper. To 
Ms. Snow's astonishment, Reuters refused to publish the 
material,. considering it merely propaganda. United Press, 
however, was glad to accept the material as news, and from 
then on reported regularly on China's student movement as a 
significantdevelopment. As Ms. Snow put it, "That, symbol-
ically, was.the moment Americans took the torch from the 
British. Fighting the Fascist. Axis was our way, too, and 
the U.P. vaguely cottoned to this." The year was 1935. 36 
A story about a student.petition, however, was not 
~nough of a story to create the kind of public awareness the 
Snows and the students wanted or needed. The Snows conceived 
of the idea for a student demonstration and helped carry out 
the December 9 and 16 student·demonstrations in Peking in 
1935. Some 800 students participated on the 6th, and over ten 
thousand took part on the 16th. It is Ms. Snow's view that 
the rest of China took its cue from this student movement, 
which had begun in her home, with her encouragement. She 
taught them how to take their news to the press • the 
foreign press especially, and both the domestic and foreign 
press did cover the demonstrations. Some articles speculated 
that the student movement was being led by Americans and by 
Chinese professors who had graduated from American universi-
ties. One Japanese article claimed the movement had been 
started by a young American woman and that she had no doubt 
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been financed by President Roosevelt. 37 Snow assumed the 
reference was to her activities. 
The student movement continued to make the headlines 
until after the school year ended in 1936, when the focus of 
attention shifted to Sian. Young Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang 
was headquartered in Sian, and was considered "Number Two 
Fascist of China." The student movement, however, had con-
verted him to active anti-fascism, and it was Chang who 
arrested his boss, Chiang Kai-shek, in an effort to end the 
Chinese civil war. 
According to Ms. Snow "The anti-Fascist alliance that 
would win World War II was born in part at Yenching Univer-
sity" with the student movement which had been born in her 
home. Indeed, she states: 
The December 9th student movement marked a histor-ical epoch, the fourth state of the six listed by 
Mao Tse-tung in the history of China from 1919, as published in his thesis "On the New Democracy." 38 
That December 9th movement and the Sian Incident of 1936 
were, according to Ms. Snow, part of the recipe by which Mao 
finally won the victory and established a new government in 
1949. Never again, Ms. Snow says, were foreigners at the 
point of leverage in China that we were in 1935 to 1938. 
After the American intervention against the Communists from 
1947 to 1949, it seemed impossible to many Americans that 
such progressive and happy Chinese-American cooperation had 
ever happened. 
Yet from 1935 on, according to Ms. Snow, it was these 
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students who were the liaison with the West for the left-wing 
and Communist elements in China, and they were the engineers 
of the rapprochement. of 1972 ••• when it was Edgar Snow who 
got Mao Tse-tung's permission for President Nixon to come to 
Peking. Thus, says Ms. Snow, the "new China-American friend-
ship was born in the December 9th movement of 1935 in Peking," 
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a movement she helped start. 
It is interesting to note that two individuals who have 
been claimed as Oklahomans played significant roles in the 
story of developing u.s.-china relations in the 1930s and 
1940s. Agnes Smedley, considered the first of the "daredevil 
journalists" to proactively support the Chinese Communist 
revolution was one. The other was Oklahoma's General Patrick 
J. Hurley, President Roosevelt's Ambassador to China in 1944, 
whose part in the unsuccessful effort to create a coalition 
government and subsequent recommendation to support Chiang 
Kai-shek's KMT resulted in what Hans Morgenthau refers to as 
one of this century's most crucial political decisions. 
The two exemplified the two opposing forces that strug-
gled against one another so intensely during the KMT-CCP 
civil war. They also exemplify the classic rift between 
journalist and politician that plagues any period of contro-
versial development. Smedley wrote about the Communist move-
ment with sympathy and passion. She was one of those who not 
only wrote about the revolution but who also participated in 
it. Hurley initially failed to see the Communists as signifi-
cant, then later blamed them for most of China's problems. 
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In Battle Hymn of China Smedley refers to the impact on 
journalists of American naivete, and reflects on the kind of 
frustration Jack Belden felt about the problem journalists had 
in influencing the views of the people back home: 
The American public seemed so uninformed or mis-informed, or so very soft, that it seemed inca-pable of facing a situation so serious. Because 
of.this the foreign correspondents feared to send 
out the true facts. "The Truth?" one foreign 
correspondent said. "I simply don't know what 
the truth is!" So we all suffered from a kind of 
mental paralysis.40 
Smedley was not one .to be really.paralyzed, however. 
She·continued to write about and participate in China's revo-
lution. Early in her career she won the admiration of some 
of those she undoubtedly considered "uninformed or misin-
formed." In 1940 the Tulsa World ran a two-part feature about 
her under the headlines: ''Oklahoma Girl ••• War Nurse in 
China • • • Sees Murderous Japanese RaY'age a Nation" and, 
"Under Fire in China ••• Adventures of an Oklahoma Girl." 
In the articles no mention at all is made of the CCP-KMT con-
flict. Smedley·is pictured as a valiant war nurse helping 
Chinese soldiers in their fight against Japan. The newspaper 
tries hard to claim Smedley as an Oklahoman, in spite of her 
stat~ment to them that she really was born in Missouri and 
spent very little if any time at all in Oklahoma. She also 
mentioned to them that most states would not be so eager to 
1 . h t• 41 c a~m er as a na ~ve. 
In January, 1937, both the Kansas City Star42 and the 
Enid Daily Eagle43 had run Associated Press articles that 
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describe Smedley as an Oklahoma-born writer who "Represents 
Force of Million (Red) Soldiers," and as a "Former State 
Girl" who had become a "White Empress Ove·r Yellow Millions." 
Those articles did admit that Smedley had begun to cause 
concern among American officials. The AP lead reads:· 
Heralded as a power in forging a new communistic 
empire in North China, with perhaps a million fighting men ready to march, Agnes Smedley, Okla-homa-born writer and champion of "downtrodden 
masses," troubled United States authorities on both sides of the continent in the World War. 
When Smedley's. Battle Hymn of China was published in 
1943, the New York Herald Tribune ran a full-page review of 
the book by then Lieutenant Colonel Evans Fordyce Carlson. 
Carlson, who had himself.been impressed by the Communists in 
China, wrote: 
The story of China which Miss Smedley presents is 
not the story one sees in the public press or in 
magazine articles or in propaganda literature. It is the story of the real China.44 
Carlson, while acting as a Marine intelligence Officer, 
had advised FDR {as had Snow) that for the u.s. to assist 
only the Nationalists might be "insufficient or counterpro-
ductive." Carlson's commitment to the Communists was re-
sented by the Navy Department and ofcourse by the KMT. 
Increasingly frustrated and isolated by his "dissident 
views," in 1938 Carlson resigned his commission and returned 
to the U.S. to work as a journalist lobbying for aid to 
China. 45 His career as a journalist was to be a temporary 
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one, however even after he returned to his military career he 
never changed his views about which China deserved American 
Support. However as Michael Schaller stated in The U.S. Cru-
sade in China, 1938-1~45, 
• • • the only demonstrable affect the Sino-
Japanese War had so far upon influential Americans 
was seen in Henry Luce's decision to place Gener-
alissimo and Madame Chiang on the cover of Time 
magazine as 1937 "Man and Wife of the Year.~ 
Patrick Hurley, on the other hand, had to be pleased that 
his president followed his advice and agreed to support the 
KMT. Hurley's task had not been easy. Having been unsuccess-
ful in his attempt to create a coalition between Chiang and 
Mao, he had ignored or opposed the advice of virtually every 
member of his China Embassy staff, as well as all of the posi-
tive stories about the Communists and the negative ones about 
the KMT being written by American journalists. It took ignor-
ing the "liberal" press and firing his entire staff, but Hur-
ley did get his way. His frustration had to have come later, 
when the KMT, in spite of u.s. aid, fell to the Communists. 
That fall was an embarrassing one for America, and it 
was an expensive one. It hurt and angered us. It became 
important to determine who or what had been responsible for 
our failure. As frequently happens following a fall, we 
indulged in some irrational behavior that most later regretted. 
In the 1950s, the victory of the Chinese Communists over the 
KMT was blamed on those diplomats and journalists who had 
failed to fully support the ~1T. Generally, anyone who had 
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spoken well of the CCP or ill of the KMT was considered as 
having contributed to the American failure in China. The 
antics of this era, led by the China Lobby, reflected a 
nation reacting ungracefully to its own mistakes. If the 
conduct of our foreign policy during the 1940s was clumsy, 
our reaction in the 1950s to that policy's failure was a 
travesty. We demonstrated the classic propensity to make 
our messengers responsible for bad news. 
Both Mao and Chiang had sought to lead the Chinese 
people out of the old oppressive social, economic and 
psychological commitments and into new democratic patterns. 
Mao's method was to develop a form of Communism geared 
toward the Chinese peasants that was destined to succeed. 
Chiang's method was development of a form of capitalism 
that held greater appeal to American decision-makers, but 
which was des.tined to fail on mainland China. Unfortunately 
for American journalists working in China during the 1930s 
and 1940s, the Chinese civil war led to a very damaging 
confrontation here in the U.S. between two passionately 
opposing factions. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE REVOLUTIONARIES' RESPONSE TO 
AMERICAN JOURNALISTS 
When the Chinese Communists first settled in Yenan in 
1935 after their "Long March," they experienced a period of 
isolation that was partially imposed on them by Chiang Kai-
shek's Kuomintang blockade, but which was also partly of 
their own design. During those early years, Mao Tse-tung 
and his leaders had little_ interest in public relations or 
in communicating with the rest of the world, according to 
Robert Desmond in his 1937 book, The Press and World Affairs. 1 
This time was needed to recuperate from the Long March, to 
plan the future, to organize. Fighting the Japanese and 
coping with the KMT were also demanding preoccupations. 
With a man like Mao Tse-tung as leader, however, isola~ 
tion was to be neither total nor permanent. Lucien Pye 
describes Mao as uniquely a "man of action" as well as a 
"word man" : 
Mao Tse-tung not only combined both skills, but 
also excelled in each. In the realm of words and ideas he was an ideologue and an orator whose 
style has been that of an agitator and spokesman, 
and also sloganeer. As a calculator of actions he has been both a military and political strate-gist • • • It is important to appreciate that this was a time when the Chinese people were at a point in their collective history in which their 
39 
paramount needs were precisely a new v1s1on based 
on the articulation of ideas and efficacious poli-
tical actions.2 
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Pye describes Mao's tendency to use words as weapons in 
political battles, and to attribute to words "an almost 
innate power • • • in the sense of believing that everyone 
else can be reduced to impotence if. one can confront them 
with the right word." 3 Mao's fascination with words began, 
Pye writes, when he first came upon newspapers during the 
1911 revolution. For Mao, the media, unlike books, were 
very much related to action. He wrote his first article and 
posted it on a wall in Changsha in 1911, and from that time 
on he increas~ngly "linked .the media to action and to the 
expectation that words could change the world." 4 
While the Communists had limited contact with American 
journalists during the early Yenan years, the contact they 
did have was significant. Agnes Smedley and Edgar Snow, the 
two eartiest of the Americans to.venture into Yenan, not 
only provided information about the Communists to the Ameri-
can public, they also gave the Communists an opportunity to 
understand Americans. It was the successful, friendly rela-
tions that developed between Mao and these journalists that 
made Mao realize how beneficial diplomacy with the American 
government might be. 
According to James Reardan-Anderson, it was the positive 
experience wi"t:h Snow that ta~ght Yenan that "there were £cdr-
minded and influential foreigners who could be convinced by 
what they saw and whose message would redound to the 
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Communists' favor. In later years in Chungking, Chou En-lai 
was to become expert at cultivating the good will of foreign 
journalists along with the diplomats from the countries the 
5 newspapers represented. 
Kenneth Shewmaker also evaluates the impact of Snow and 
Smedley on the Communists as crucial. The Chinese eo_mmunists, 
he states, "had no better foreign friend than the American 
woman {Smedley) who gave herself unstintingly in her efforts 
to further their cause." 6 Not only did Edgar Snow completely 
alter the American view of the Chinese Communists, he also 
gave the Chinese themselves their first authoritative perspec-
tive on the Communist movement. 7 Shewmaker cites Ernest Hem-
ingway: 
By catering to journalists of the caliber of Edgar Snow • • • the Communists had gained an extrava-
gant idea of the Eight Route Army's role in the 
·struggle against the Japanese.8 
In fact, that Army could, in the end, claim a very major role 
in the Communists' successful fight against the KMT and the 
Japanese. 
Shewmaker makes the point that it was the skill of the 
Yenan Chinese Communists in presenting their case that helped 
to explain why Chiang Kai-shek imposed the blockade against 
travel into the Communist area. It was not just that Chiang 
wanted the Communists cut off from the.outside world; he also 
wanted the outside world cut off from the Communists. It was 
hard enough for him to persuade Americans in China that his 
own regime was not as corrupt as it appeared to be, without 
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also having to persuade them that the Communists were not as 
good as they appeared to be. 
Mao, recognizing the potential benefits of friendship 
with American journalists, did use those who were sympathetic 
with what the Communists were doing. He used Snow, Smedley 
and Anna Louise Strong not only as propagandists against the 
KMT, but also to bolster his efforts in 1937 to promote his 
version of a United Front against Japan. On March 10, 1937, 
for instance, Mao wrote a letter to Snow asking him to pub-
licize a new CCP policy concerning the United Front. Along 
with the letter, Mao enclosed a copy of Smedley's interview 
with him about the Sian Incident and on Sino-Japanese rela-
t . 9 1.ons. Mao clearly was intent on keeping the American jour-
nalists (and the American public) up to date and well 
informed about his work. Snow, Smedley and Strong took Mao's 
message to the American public in the form of both articles 
and books that expressed a sympathetic view of the CCP. 
Anna Louise Strong was happy to be used by Mao to pro-
mote his strategies. She had first gone to China in 1925, 
eager to become involved in the revolution she saw developing 
there. During the 1930s and 1940s she wrote about revolution 
wherever she found it, including China, Spain and Russia. In 
1946 she returned to China, where she lived in Yenan and con-
tinued her journalistic support for the Communist revolution. 
It was in 1946 that she obtained her famous interview with 
Mao (published in English in Amerasia, April 1947) in which 
he proclaimed that all reaQtionaries were paper tigers, that 
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those reactionaries were preparing for WW III, and that the 
danger of that war did really exist. 10 
According "to biographical notes in Notable American 
Women • • • the Modern Period, Strong wanted to stay on in 
Yenan, but instead Mao "urged her to go and publicize the 
revolution abroad."ll This she did, to the consternation 
of the Soviet Union, where she went to do her writing, and 
from which she was deported by the Russians as a spy. 
Strong went from Russia to the u.s., to return to Moscow 
after the Russians exonerated her in 1955. She only stayed 
there briefly, however, before returning to Peking, where 
she published the Letter from China, reporting on Sino-Soviet 
relations and giving readers in the West a glimpse of life in 
China. Strong was to continue her revolutionary writings 
until her death in 1970 at the age of 85. In 1965 on her 
eightieth birthday, Mao Tse-tung honored her by making her an 
honorary member of the Red Guard. She was buried in Peking's 
National Memorial Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs, near the 
grave of Agnes Smedley. The two women are the only foreigners 
. h h 12 ever g~ven t at onor. 
Snow, Smedley and Strong were three key journalists who 
risked going into Yenan during the blockade years, who worked 
hard to get their stories into the American press, and who 
were used by Mao to improve his standing with Americans. The 
stories these sympathetic journalists told about the Commun-
ists w~re often received with s.kepticism, however, and by 
1944 American military and diplomatic personnel began to 
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demand the opportunity to go into Yenan to either confirm or 
discredit the stories. Chiang finally permitted first a team 
of journalists and then a group of diplomatic observers into 
Yenan. 
The "Dixie Mission," so called because it was sent into 
rebel territory to answer the question, "Is it true what they 
say about Dixie?" went into Yenan during the summer of 1944. 13 
Included in the mission were representatives of the u.s. Army, 
Air Corps, Navy, State Department, and Office of Strategic 
Services. Head of the Mission was Colonel David Barrett; 
Chief political reporter was John Service, a Foreign Service 
officer who had grown up in China as the son of a missionary 
f '1 14 aml. Y. 
Dixie Mission members were impressed with what they saw, 
and sent back positive reports to Washington about what looked 
like efforts to democratize an area formerly ruled by despot-
ism. While waiting for Washington to make its decision, some 
of the OSS officers began offering the Communists instruction 
in the use of some American weapons; and relationships between 
the Chinese and Americans in Yenan improved to the point of 
mutual admiration. Speaking for the Dixie Mission, John Ser-
vice reported that the observers' response was "extremely 
favorable • • • All of our party have had the same feeling--
that we have come into a different country and are meeting a 
different people."15 
The Communists' response to both the diploma-ts and the 
journalists was also positive; with the Dixie Mission 
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responding well and Stilwell on their side, they became opti-
mistic about the possibility of receiving support from the 
Americans in the form of arms for the continuing fight 
against Japan. While Mao's foreign policy at that point was 
not well established, he made it clear that he was open to 
the possibility of friendly relations with Americans. He was 
also reported to be open to a balanced coalition with the R}1T 
for purposes of a United Front against Japan. He was, in 
fact, reported to advocate friendly relations with the Russians 
or with any nation willing to fight Japanese Imperialism. 
This, at least, is the interpretation of Reardon-Anderson. 
Chinese foreign policy, he claims, was based not on ideology, 
but on circumstances. His thesis, expressed in Yenan and the 
Great Powers: the Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 
1944-1946, is that "in its formative years, Chinese Communist 
foreign policy followed no master plan; rather it was a series 
of adjustments to the circumstances that entwined and entangled 
Yenan." 16 Mao simply did not have the luxury of a grand ideo-
logical design during those first years in Yenan. His foreign 
policy decisions had to be made pragmatically. 
Mao's response to the journalists who visited Yenan in 
1944 was, therefore, pragmatic. He did, as Hemingway pointed 
out, catered to them. He also made it clear to them that it 
was his "burning desire" above all else to fight the Japanese 
d . 1' . d' . f th h' l7 an lmprove lVlng con ltlons or e C lnese peasants. 
Whether Mao was using a political tactic or not, he convinced 
virtually every member of the press and most other observers, 
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that his goals were both noble and practical. The journal-
ists, as Mao had hoped, sent glowing reports back to their 
newspapers, and Yenan·knew they were "scoring points" when 
they read those favorable news stories reprinted in Chinese 
newspapers, or when they listened to journalists like Har-
rison Forman virtually promise American. aid to the Commun-
ists in speeches he made in the area. As Dixie Mission 
member John Davies, a Foreign Service officer, said: "The 
forthrightness, energy and efficiency of the Americans who 
compose the Observer Section has made an excellent impres-
sion on Yenan leaders."18 The Communist press responded 
with equal enthusiasm as exemplified in a 1944 Chieh-fang 
Jih-pao Fourth of July editorial: 
Democratic America has already found a companion, 
and the cause of Sun Yat-sen a successor, in the Chinese Communist Party and the other democratic forces • • • The work which we Communists are 
carrying on today is the very same work which was 
carried on earlier in America by Washington, 
Jefferson, and Lincoln; it will certainly obtain, 
and indeed has already obtained, the sympathy of democratic America.l9 
Theodore White agrees with Reardon-Anderson that Commun-
ist decisions vis-a-vis the Americans were pragmatically 
rather than ideologically based. That common sense approach 
continued even after negotiations toward a coalition with the 
KMT broke down under Hurley's leadership, and Roosevelt 
decided to give aid exclusively to the corrupt KMT regime. 
At that point, White says, in Thunder Out of China, the KMT 
and the Communists went their separate ways. 20 The KMT took 
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the road of propaganda and promises; having won the American 
Ambassador, they tried to consolidate their conquest with 
brilliant doubletalk. The Communists, acc<?rding to White, 
did not give up on the Americans, but they did give up on 
diplomacy. Having lost at negotiating, they "took the rough, 
direct way of the battlefield," and waged a military offen-
sive that would secure American recognition, and the arms and 
supplies that they hoped would follow recognition. 21 
In White's opinion, the Communists thought that American 
recognition of Chiang was a pragmatic one based on an inac-
curate assessment of where the military strength was in China. 
The Americans thought Chiang had the superior military power; 
the Americans wanted to use that power against Japan, so they 
supported Chiang. The Communists·perceived that the Americans 
knew that the Chiang regime was corrupt, but that expediency 
called for cooperation. The Communists' response was to prove 
to the Americans that they would be a more valuable ally than 
the Communists against the Japanese. In fact, American leaders 
had simply decided that "Chiang Kai-shek and China were exactly 
the same thing," that there were two armed parties in China, 
and that the Kuomintang "held the international franchise." 22 
America refused to recognize the Chinese Communists as an 
official entity. "The Communists for their part refused to be 
nonrecognized out of existence." 23 
In 1945 the Communists worked hard on military campaigns 
against the Japanese in hopes of attracting American support, 
while continuing to fight with the KMT. The KMT, in the 
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meantime, worked hard at maintaining its good relationship 
with America. To that end, White says, Chiang began to 
"redecorate his government in a style to please the American 
taste." 24 White calls 1945 "the year of the great promise" 
during which tremendous changes were made by the KMT '· on 
paper, toward making China a democracy. It was to be, the 
people were told, an era of great reform, with a huge 
national congress to be held, legislative resolutions writ-
ten, pronouncements made about the end of one-party rule 
and the beginni~g of a new democracy. None of the promises 
were kept; the words· had not been spoken, White claims, to 
bring about actual results. "The resolutions and promises 
had been read and noted with approval in America; that was 
the important thing." 25 
White describes how Chiang failed to attain his goals 
through "propaganda and promises" methods in 1945. Much 
earlier, Agnes Smedley had described the dismal, destructive 
condition of the Chinese and fore.ign press in Shanghai. 
During the early 1930s Chiang's government upheld a policy 
of press repression made effective through bribery, torture 
and murder. Smedley's July 3, ,19 35 article, "The Corrupt 
Press in China," 26 published in The Nation reported that the 
suppression of both the local and foreign press was so effec-
tive that the authorities could do literally whatever they 
wanted and force journalists to print exactly what they wanted 
them to say. It was this total corruption and control over 
both the local and foreign press that Smedley intimates 
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created the worldwide confusion over what was going on in 
China between the KMT and the CCP during the 1930s. Smedley 
was to continue her attempts to expose KMT efforts to control 
or at least distort press .coverage of its own regime and of 
the Communists throughout her career. 
The Nationalists, however, were not alone in their 
attempts to "use'' the foreign press to their advantage. 
Roxane Witke in her biography of Mao's wife, Comrade Chiang 
Ch'ing, makes the point that both man and wife: 
••• were especially aware of and concerned with 
what was the greatest challenge of revolutionary 
leadership • • • to manipulate the human mind, to 
motivate the ignorant and the educated alike to 
turn their backs on centuries-old values in the 
new name of proletarian class interest.27 
To that end, the Maoist form of mass media was used as a vital 
tool. Comrade Chiang assured Witke that "under Mao's rule, 
the freedoms of conscience, expression, and the press 
were condemned as bourgeouis, reactionary, and counterrevolu-
tionary."28 Mao, she said, had no more qualms against mani-
pulating foreign journalists than he had against manipulating 
the masses. ~vi tke makes note of the way in ~V'hich Anna Louise 
Strong, for example, " ••• in a sense earned her keep (in 
Yenan) through literary proof of her 'friendship.'" 29 Strong 
is referred to as one of the few Americans to make ahome in 
Yenan during the tumul tous _revolutionary years, and there is 
little doubt how willing she was to be used as part of the 
Communist movement. Nor is there much doubt about Mao's 
willingness to use her or any other sympathetic journalist in 
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his efforts to gain American support. 
While the Communists were using American journalists 
such as Strong, Smedley and Snow to attract recognition and 
support, the Nationalists were also manipulating the press, 
and so were the Americans. The Communists were fortunate 
in that they seemed to have a larger number of good stories 
to tell and plenty of journalists eager to write the stories. 
The Nationalists' tactic had to be a matter of concealing 
their problems and coming up with positive stories to tell. 
In 1943 Chiang Kai-shek wrote China's Destiny and Chinese 
Economic Theory. The two-volume book.outlines China's devel-
opment during the 1930s and describes Chiang's economic 
theories and plans. In Jaffe's notes to the American edition 
of the book which finally was published in 1947, he calls the 
book a whitewash. No mention at all is made of the entire 
civil war going on during the period. No mention is made of 
the Sian Incident or of the split within the KMT itself. 
Enough is said about Chiang's economic and political views, 
however, to urge American officials to try to keep the book 
out of the U.S. so the American public would not find out 
h t k . d f t th . t t' 30 w a ~n o sys em e~r governmen was supper ~ng. By 
the time the book reached American readers, their leaders 
had become committed to Chiang and the Communists were on 
their way to victory. 
IC 
China expert A. Doal Barnett is one of the many China 
experts who point out that Communists have always been good 
at exploiting the weakness of an existing regime. He 
describes in his 1962 book, Communist China in Perspective, 
how Mao had from the beginning of his political career used 
China's primitive media as a means for rousing the masses 
' ff. ' 1 t. Jl A . 1' t. 1 aga~nst o ~c~a corrup ~on. s Mao grew ~n po ~ ~ca 
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sophistication, he developed a most effective method of man-
ipulating both the domestic and foreign media in his effort 
to lead the Communists into a position of leadership in 
China. His tactics were effective in gaining the support 
of the Chinese people, but they failed to attract the sup-
port of the u.s. government. America's inability to respond· 
positively to the Chinese Communists during this period 
exemplifies our tendency to consider it in our best interest 
to support even a corrupt Capitalist regime over a Communist 
one, even if the Communist one is more popular with the 
people and is more effective in solving the country's prob-
lems. 
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CHAPTER IV 
U.S. POLITICAL RESPONSE TO 
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 
It is Michael Schaller's opinion, expressed in his 1979 
book, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century, 
that: 
American leaders never fully understood or accep-ted the reality of the Chinese revolution. Wash-ington's policy toward the Chinese Communists, 
with few exceptions, oscillated between indiffer-
ence and profound hostility.! 
This failure to recognize the importance of the Chinese 
Communists or to see them as an arm of a Moscow-led inter-
national conspiracy had, in Schaller's view, a disastrous 
effect on relations between the U.S. and China. 
Schaller points out that prior to Wd II there had been 
little contact between U.S. officials and the Chinese Commun-
ists, and what little there was led to confusion. The 
"experts" had a hard time understanding how communism could 
appeal to peasants. The conclusion was that the whole move-
ment was part of Moscow's effort to export its revolution, or 
that it was merely an insignificant agrarian reform movement, 
not to be taken too seriously. 
President Roosevelt was faced, in the 1940s, with having 
to choose from among a variety of sources of information upon 
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which to base his decision concerning what to do in China. 
While some American journalists who had been in China advo-
cated support for the Communists, others, including influ-
encial ones like Henry Luce, urged support for the KMT. 
FOR's diplomatic advisors were also divided in their ~ecom­
ni.endations, with a majori.ty advising support for Chiang, 
but with some persuasive voices speaking in favor of the 
CCP. In an effort to clarify the situation, in 1941 
Roosevelt appointed Dr. Lauchlin Currie as his personal 
envoy to Chungking to analyze the situation there and 
return with a recommendation for action. Currie was to be 
the first among several such.personal representatives of 
President Roosevelt in China, and he was one of several who 
advised u.s. support for the KMT. Currie's plan included a 
recommendation to appoint a team of American experts to act 
as advisors to Chiang's government. In order to bolster 
support for the KMT among American liberals, Currie also 
s~ggested that "The White House could use the press in this 
sales campaign by leaking "inspired stories from Washing-
ton extolling Chiang's virtue." 2 
Currie advised Roosevelt that the KMT-CCP rift was a 
serious matter needing attention. His recommendation was to 
urge Chiang to "promote liberal economic reforms" to ease 
the problem, a recommendation which seemed to inspire little 
enthusiastic response from Chiang. An additional suggestion 
from Currie was for Roosevelt to send a personal representa-
tive to Chungking who would act as a presidential envoy and 
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political advisor to Chiang's government. The president 
accepted the advice, and selected Owen Lattimore, a liberal 
Asia scholar, for the job of somehow transforming the KMT 
into something more closely resembling a democracy. That 
unrealistic goal was never attained. What did develop by 
the end of 1941 was an American foreign policy in East Asia 
which was dedicated to the preservation and support of 
Nationalist China in the growing tension over Japan. The 
Chinese Communist issue became a relatively minor one com-
pared with the other world events demanding u.s. response 
during those months. 3 
After Pearl Harbor and the u.s. entry into WW II, 
Roosevelt continued to look to Nationalist China as at least 
potentially a powerful ally in Asia. In his view the KMT 
just needed some reform. He did not realize that it was, in 
reality, a "crumbling regime" whose popular support and pol-
itical and military power were growing weaker and weaker. 
Further, he did not see that as this occurred: 
• • • the forces of social revolution grew con-
sistently~:.stronger ,. accelerating the internal 
cris·is and unraveling the web of American pol-
icy. The demise of the United Front and 
Nationalist power removed the buffer between 
the Chinese Communists and the United States, 
placing these two powerful forces on a col- . 
lision course.4 
Political analysts appear to agree that Roosevelt suf-
fered from a tendency to set contradictory goals, or to make 
decisions based on unrealistic assessments of situations. 
Michael Schaller points out that: 
From the beginning of the war, Roosevelt groped 
for a China policy which would do several, some-
times contradictory, things at once.S 
The President wanted China as a strong ally against Japan, 
but he failed to see that a U.S.-KMT alliance would not 
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help toward attaining that goal. This tendency was exacer-
bated in China by Roosevelt's .tendency to rely on personal 
representatives he sent into the area whose views often con-
flicted with those of experienced on-site experts. 
James MacGregor Burns in his 1970 book, Roosevelt: the 
Soldier of Freedom, echoes Schaller's views about Roosevelt's 
tendency toward setting contradictory goals. Burn's thesis 
is that Roosevelt was: 
• • • a man divided by his dual ambition to be on 
one hand a man with lofty ideals crusading for an. ideal goal, and on.·the other hand he was an ambi-
tious authoritarian intent on protecting his own 
power and on attaining personal goals.6 
This dualism led to problems in the conduct of WW II, in 
Burnsr opinion, and contributed to the Cold War and to sub-
sequent transformation in the nature of the presidency itself. 
It was his contradictory decisions that flawed Roosevelt's 
war strategy and then led to poisoned post-WW II relations 
with Russia and Asia. 
In Burns' chapter on Roosevelt's "Strategy of Freedom," 
he discusses the "stupendous social and economic forces on 
the rise" throughout the world: 
Reports were trickling in from intelligence agen-
cies, from newspaper correspondents, including the 
brilliant Theodore White of the Time bureau in Chungking, from famous writers, including Pearl Buck and Agnes Smedley, of the dedication and 
tenacity of the Chinese Communists, as contras-
ted with the increasing corruption and lethargy 
of the Kuomintang.7 
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Burns emphasizes that Roosevelt's gift for political communi-
cation gave "a marvelous lift and verve to the propaganda 
effort," but that there was a serious gap between the lofty 
principles and the day-to.-day situations and opportunities. 8 
Burns indicates that while Roosevelt was good at expres-
sing ideals, he was less adept at making realistic decisions 
based on a clear assessment of the real world. He claims, 
further, that Roosevelt had "a double handicap in the propa-
9 ganda battle." The President's war aims and post-war plans 
were too broadly stated to be converted into "bread and but-
ter policies" meaningful to those in foreign countries. 
When he succeeded in transforming his idealistic goals into 
proposals and policies, he was "frustrated by congressional 
conservativism, entrenched lobbies, and organized 
lth 1110 wea • • • 
In 1937 Frederick Field, writing in Amerasia, had warned 
that "The opinion Americans form regarding China is probably 
today a more important factor in determining the course of 
world events than it has ever been before." 11 Field tried to 
persuade Americans to become involved in the foreign policy 
decision-making process. The general policy he wanted the 
public to push for was positive involvement in the Far East 
as opposed to the isolationist tendencies prevalent at the 
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time. In 1937 the Far Eastern question was just beginning 
to be discussed in academia and in the media, and Field was 
optimistic that "for the first time in our history it has 
been possible in part to base government policy on the 
expression of public desire." 12 Field, chairman of the edi-
torial board of Amerasia, and Phillip :Jaffe, managing editor, 
devoted themselves to ~elping to keep the public informed 
about Far East-American relations, and for their efforts were 
later to become among those accused of complicity in the sue-
cess of the Chinese Communists and the failure of American 
foreign policy concerning China. In 1944 Patrick Hurley tried 
his best to limit the kinds of information that came out of 
the American Embassy in China in an effort to sway American 
political response to what was going on there. With Hurley and 
Henry Luce speaking and working in behalf of the Nationalists, 
and other observers speaking ardently in favor of the Commun-
ists, it is not surprising that American political response to 
the China situation was somewhat uncertain. 
Tang Tsou prefaces his analysis of America's failure in 
China with the acknowledgment that: 
More than any other single person, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was responsible for what happened in China; for responsibility goes with power and Chiang was the most powerful figure in China.l3 
However, Tang feels that the "loss of China" was also a failure 
of American foreign policy, for in the war against Japan, 
Nationalist China was our ally, and that ally lost. (And later 
in the battles in North Korea and in Vietnam, Communist China 
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was a strong power involved in defeating American armies.) 
Tang's thesis is that_the one element in our China policy 
that was most responsible for our failure was the imbalance 
between ends and means. Agreeing with Schaller and Burns, 
Tang points out that the imbalance took two forms. First, the 
u.s. was unwilling and at times unable to use military power 
to achieve political objectives. Second, the imbalance 
"appears as an unwillingness and inability to abandon unattain-
able goals in order to avoid entanglement in a hopeless 
cause. 1114 The result of this imbalance was an illusion about 
the nature and power of the CCP vs. the KMT, and about the 
potential for a u.s. role in dealing with the two factions. 
Walter Lippmann also agrees with those who blame the 
American problem with China. on the failure to balance commit-
ments and power. In 1943. in u.s. Foreign Policy: Shield of 
the Republic he expressed the view that while the U.S. J;nain-
tained a viable foreign policy during the nineteenth century, 
that policy became "dangerously inadequate after 1900."15 He 
argues that because of our failure to create a national foreign 
policy at the turn of the century, the nation was unprepared to 
either wage war or to make peace, and that it has remained 
divided within itself concerning the conduct of American foreign 
relations. 
Lippmann describes the world situation in 1937-39 and 
includes especially decisions made by the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations concerning our abrogation of our Commercial 
Treaty with Japan and our refusal to lift the arms embargo 
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which prevented Britain and France from buying u.s. arms to 
resist Germany--"the Germany which had been allied with 
Japan since 1936." Lippmann remarks that "It would,be hard 
to find a more perfect example of total incompetence in guid-
ing the foreign relations of a.people." 16 We invited. war on 
the one hand and refused to take steps to fortify our defenses 
on the other hand. It was this failure to balance commitments 
and power that led to disastrous foreign policy decisions, in· 
Lippmann's view. Lippmann, along with Burns, Tang, Schaller, 
Morgenthau and others, appears to- agree that American foreign 
policy toward China during the first half of the twentieth 
century is an example of the democratic process not function-
ing at optimum pitch. 
The Dixie Mission did not help, with experienced "China 
Hands" like Colonel Barrett, who headed the Mission, so 
impressed with the Communists that he enthusiastically recom-
mended that u.s. arms shouldgo to the CCP. Barrett was con-
vinced that the primary drive of the Communists was to "fight 
the Japanese and help the people." 17 He agreed with Stilwell 
that u.s. aid would be better spent on the Communists. At 
the same time, however, Major General Patrick Hurley, at the 
insistence of Chiang Kai-shek, was in the process of recom-
mending that Roosevelt fire Stilwell and send aid only to the 
KMT. Hurley's effort to create a coalition between the KMT 
and the CCP had by this time failed. Hurley stressed that 
the Kuomintang was the official voice of China, and that the 
Communists were not really a viable entity. His tactic was 
to try to talk the Communists into accepting a minor role 
in the Chinese political system. That suggestion was 
quickly, and predictably, rejected by the Communists, who 
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then tried to bypass Hurley and deal directly with Washing-
ton. In the meantime, the Embassy staff had similarly 
tried to "go over Hurley's head" and express their views 
directly to Roosevelt about the KMT-CCP aid issue. 
Needless to say, when Hurley discovered these efforts 
at "subterfuge," his attitude toward the Communists and 
his staff took a radical turn. He blamed all of China's 
problems on the Communists and charged any Americans with 
sympathetic views toward the CCP with conspiracy. The 
good relations that had begun to develop in Yenan among 
Dixie Mission members and the Communists dissolved. Roose-
velt agreed to aid the KMT exclusively, and sought support 
for that decision from the Russians. 18 · 
Roosevelt's decision to seek cooperation from Soviet 
dictator Joseph Stalin came early in 1945, when FDR began 
to realize that full~scale civil war between the KMT and 
CCP was imminent. As Schaller put it, the American presi-
dent's dream of a "powerful, united and pro-American China" 
was fast becoming a nightmare." 19 An escalating civil war 
in China would prolong unrest in the Far East, tempting 
the Russians to step in to provide a Moscow version of 
stability. Roosevelt's response was the Yalta policy, giv-
ing the Russians important concessions in Manchuria in 
exchange for support for the KMT and .help in the war 
against Japan, it did nothing to weaken the CCP in its 
63 
power struggle against the KMT. 
American political response to China at this point was 
divided between the "old hand" China experts who had an 
understanding of the country based on study and first-hand 
experience, and those who had to make their assessments from 
a distance, without the benefit of direct observation. Hur-
ley had gone into China with little background on Chinese 
culture or history and with a limited understanding of what 
was going on in Yenan. According to Tang Tsou, neither Hur-
ley nor anyone in Washington was interested ~n fighting the 
Chinese Communists along with the Japanese. American offi-
cials wanted to believe the journalists and other observers 
who claimed the Communists would b~ a strong ally against 
Japan, but they could not be convinced that the Communists 
in China were a viable enough force to warrant support. 
Washington therefore went along with Hurley's mistaken 
assessment that the CCP "lacked real strength and genuine 
popular support." 20 
Tang agrees with Schaller and Reardon-Anderson concerning 
Hurley's work in China •. In addition to not viewing the Com-
munists as a real threat, Tang says, Hurley also did not see 
them as being true Communists. Hurley thought that the dif-
ference between the CCP and the KMT could be easily patched 
up, that Stalin could be coerced into a deal that would 
neutralize the Russian-China Communist coalition threat, and 
that controlling the CCP need not be a major concern of the 
u.s. As Tang says, Hurley was wrong on every count. By 
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November of 1945, his entire program had collapsed. In spite 
of u.s. support, the KMT grew weaker, the CCP grew stronger, 
and the Yalta policy proved to be not only unnecessary for 
minimizing Russian involvement, it helped create CCP antag-
onism against the u.s. 
Robert Sutter's views of the 1944-45 events in China are 
similar to the other analysis; he agrees that Washington's 
decision to follow Hurley's advice was based on a failure to 
understand that the Chinese Communists were either worthy of 
aid, or worthy of concern if they did not get aid. American 
policy was focused on sustaining a stable internal Chinese 
situation. that would not complicate u.s. negotiations with 
the USSR over East Asia, therefore Washington was reluctant 
to begin support for what it considered a fairly insignificant 
dissident group. In Hurley's. assessment, Sutter says, the 
CCP "was of little consequence," was "too weak and ineffective 
to become the dominant ruling group in China." Thus, Sutter 
concludes, "this initial encounter in CCP-U.S. relations ended 
with an opportunity lost and with old feelings of animosity 
d • • • • • t th f II 21 an susp~c~on once aga~n r~s~ng o e sur ace. 
Many analysts appear to agree then, that Patrick Hurley 
was largely responsible for the u.s.-china debacle, and that 
the U.S. would probably have been wiser to either support 
both the KMT and the CCP or neither. Don Lohbeck, Hurley's 
biographer, however, agrees with those who, back in the 1950s, 
blamed the problem on a biased press. In his view, it was 
American journalists who made it impossible for the American 
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public and their leaders to deal rationally with China. Hur-
ley was not to blame. Lohbeck impl.ies that Hurley was one of 
the few who valiantly resisted the propaganda that put forth 
the Communists as a force for democracy. It was Hurley who 
had the story right, the journalists who had become. m~re prop-
agandists for the CCP. 22 
A ~ew analysts have written with derision about Hurley as 
something of a buffoon who represented America in China in a 
most undignified manner •. He was known to do Indian war dances 
at Embassy parties and to give "blood-curdling Choctaw Yahoos" 
at wholely inappropriate moments. He pronounced Mao Tse-tung's 
name "Moose Dung" and called Chia~g Kai-shek "Mr. Shek." In 
turn, some Americans called Hurley ."the Paper Tiger," others 
called him Ti Erh Ta Feng, or "the Second Big Wind." 23 Theo-
dore White, however, takes a more objective view, stating that 
"his personality was neither interesting nor significant in 
itself; but as ambassador.of the world's greatest power his 
personality was endowed with transcedent ex-officio impor-
tance." White wrote in his 1.946 Thunder out of China that: 
All men acknowledged that Hurley had arrived in 
·chungking in great sincerity to labor as hard 
as he could at the directives given him. Most 
men who knew him well enough saw in him the tra-
. gedy of a mind_ groping desperately at problems beyond its scope.24 
White goes on to describe how Hurley disregarded the State 
Department tradition of.sending strictly factual reports to 
Washi~gton from embassies. It was taboo to tamper with facts 
in order to please a superior. Hurley, however, disapproved of 
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reports critical of the Chiang government. When his staff 
issued such reports, they were denounced. . "For months," White 
says, "When Washington should have been completely informed, 
it got little unprejudiced information from the American 
Embassy in Chungking." 25 White points out that Chiang's gover-
enment was naturally very fond of Hurley, and made every effort 
to protect him from the Amer.ican press. The Chinese chief 
.censor, in fact, officially informed an American newspaper cor-
respondent that: 
The censorship of the China government does not per-
mit anything to go .out which will disturb the cordial 
relationship between the.two governments (America and 
China) • Ambassador Hurley represents the president 
and the American government; any attack by an Ameri-
can upon him on Chinese soil is therefore not per-
mitted to go out.26 
Even General Wedemeyer, then commander in chief of the u.s. 
Army, felt it best "to protect the ambassador from the public 
criticism of war correspondents, although he privately admit-
ted the truth of many charges." The corps of foreign corres-
pondents, White states,."could only fume in silence and 
frustration at a situation which they knew must some day erupt 
in disaster." 27 
Washington, then, had to deal with both the incomplete or 
biased reports from its embassy in Chungking, as well as with 
the problems with reports coming out of Yenan. Foreign Service 
Officer John Service had reviewed reports from Harrison Forman 
(London Times and Reader's Digest), Maurice Votaw (Baltimore 
Sun), and I. Epstein (New York ·Times and Time-Life), giving 
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their impressions of the CCP in the NorthWest Communist-held 
areas. The gist of their impressions, according to Service's 
reports, was that the successful resistance of the Japanese by 
the Eighth Route Army was based on the solidarity between the 
28 peasants and the Communist Army. Service acknowledged the 
complaints from some that these reports from journalists were 
open to criticism because they were not military experts. 
However, they were experienced China reporters with an under-
standing of the culture and language of China. Service made 
the point that the chief significance of the reports was the 
political point that the Communists had the complete support 
of the local population, and that political fact was the basis 
for military strength. 29 
u.s.-China relations were not destined to improve with 
the beginning of the Truman Administration following Roose-
velt's death in 1945. As Schaller wrote: 
Whatever slim possibility existed for a modifica-
tion of American policy in China died in mid-
April with Franklin Roosevelt. His death removed 
a leader to whom the CCP had turned--without no-
table success--for understanding. The little 
that was known about Harry Truman added to the 
rapid deterioration of Soviet-American relations 
over the issues of Eastern Europe and Germany 
and boded ill for American policy toward the Com-
munist movement in China.30 
Truman, inexperienced in foreign affairs and keenly suspicious 
of the Russians, was easily convinced by anti-Communist advis-
ors to assume a tough stance against the Chinese Communists. 
Ambassador to Moscow Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of 
State Joseph Grew, Navy Secretary James Forrestal and Admiral 
68 
Leahy easily convinced Truman (more easily than Roosevelt) 
that USSR ambitions were global in nature and included seiz-
ing a foothold in Asia by establishment of puppet revolu-
tionary governments there. By the summer of 1945 the pre-
viously pro-CCP u.s. personnel in Yenan had been replaced by 
people with strong anti-Moscow views. Deteriorating u.s. 
relations with the CCP and growing suspicion concerning 
Soviet designs in Europe and Asia characterized the Truman 
Administration China policy in 1945. 
In mid-1945 President Truman sent General George Marshall 
to solve post-WW II problems in China. Specifically, Mar-
shall's mission was first, to bring peace to China under con-
ditions that would permit stable government and progress along 
democratic lines, and second, to assist the National govern-
ment to establish its authority over as wide an area of China 
'bl 31 as poss~ e. As Secretary of .State Dean Acheson later repor-
ted in his letter of transmittal accompanying the Report on 
u.s. Relations in China in 1949, (The China White Paper), both 
objectives were at that point unrealizable. Acheson wrote 
that the Chinese Communists were intent on communizing the 
whole nation and that the Nationalists were just as intent on 
destroying Communism. Marshall's efforts to negotiate agree-
ments resulted in no political settlement, and by spring of 
1946 he became convinced that "both parties were merely spar-
ring for time, jockeying for military position, and catering 
temporarily to what they believed to be American desires." 32 
Marshall left China in January of 1947 to become Truman's 
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Secretary of State. He knew, as did most observers, that 9is-
aster was imminent in China. In July of 1947, with signs that 
disaster multiplying, Marsh"all recommended that Lieutenant Gen-
eral Albert c. Wedemeyer go into China to survey the situation 
and make recommendations. By September of that year Wedemeyer 
submitted his report, recommending that the u.s. continue and 
expand its aid to Nationalist China, with three conditions: 
1. That China inform the United Nations of her request for aid. 
2. That China request the United Nations to bring about a truce in Manchuria and request that Man-churia be placed under a five-power guardianship or a trusteeship. 
3. That China utilize her own resources, reform her finances, her government, and her armies, and accept American advisers in the military and economic fields.33 
Wedemeyer's report included expressions of sympathy for the 
Nationalists regarding their struggle against the Communists, 
however it also included recommendations for a large number 
of drastic reforms he considered essential to survival of the 
KMT. 
Reform did not occur within the KMT; the Communists con-
tinued to push the Nationalists toward the sea, and the U.S. 
government finally admitted that: 
The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the Civil War in China was beyond the control of the government of the Uni-ted States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of 
internal Chinese forces, forces which this coun-
try tried to influence but could not. A deci-
sion was arrived at within China, if only a 
decision by default.34 
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The China White Paper, with its covering letter by Acheson, 
was in reality a highly negative commentary on both the CCP 
and the KMT. It was also a final admission that the U.S. 
could not effectively solve the China problem without an 
expenditure of human and material resources beyond its capa-
city to give. As Hans Morgenthau and others were to point 
out much later, China was a tragic example of our tendency 
to establish goals inconsistent with our political or econ-
omic ability to attain them. 
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CHAPTER V 
REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
While the debate has subsided concerning who has been 
to blame for troubled u.s.-China relationships throughout 
this century, the debate over the relationship between the 
press and foreign policy continues. Journalists themselves 
seem to agree with Klapper that they reflect the diversity 
of public attitudes, rather than having a significant 
impact on it or on policy making. Public officials gener-
ally are still suspicious of the press as being intrusive. 
Concerning the u.s., China, and the press in the 1930s and 
1940s, the view seems to be that the press was not much 
help in handling what was one of our worst foreign policy 
failures. 
Hans Morgenthau and Tang Tsou view America's foreign 
policy during this period as a reflection of national 
naivete and a lack of realism in goal setting. Tang faults 
journalists for failing to provide intellectual leadership. 
Journalists themselves talk about the difficulty of getting 
straight stories printed by editors. Editors were under 
pressure to print what they thought the public wanted to 
hear, or what their publishers wanted printed, and those pub-
lishers occasionally had their own biases. Clearly, confu-
sion, ignorance and bias about China were problems, and 
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those problems were reflected in the American press. 
Unbiased news reporting is generally viewed as a worthy 
goal, but it is an idealistic one that is attained only 
rarely in the real world. Bias in the "free world" press is 
seen as an acceptable part of reality first because it is 
inevitable, and second because the system allows a diversity 
of biases to be presented to the public. However, when one 
view becomes prominent, that bias can then begin to have a 
significant impact on political issues. As Ralph Townsend 
wrote in Asia Answers in 1936: 
As soon as any single trend gains predominance in publicity favor, it immediately diminishes 
its competitors. The reason is simple. Edi-
tors of magazines promptly select articles with 
views in accord with the predominant trend. 
The average unanalytic reader seeing these, 
says to himself, "All the authorities now writ-
ing on the subject have such and such a con-
clusion."l 
· 
There was never unanimity in the press about how the u.s. 
should respond to China. As Frederick Field said in 1937, 
modern technology and transportation were making it possible 
for the first time for an American policy to be based on pub-
1 . . . 2 ~c op~n~on. But the China story was an extremely complex 
one for journalists to cover and for the public and public 
officials to comprehend. Further, by the end of World War II, 
biases had become evident and editors did begin to be selec-
tive in terms of printing stories that reflected predominant 
attitude trends. After the failure of efforts in the forties 
to create a coalition between the CCP and the KMT, and the 
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u.s. decision to support the KMT exclusively, it became 
difficult and risky to write favorably about the Communists. 
The problem was not exclusive to American journalists. 
Robert Desmond quotes a Canadian correspondent who worked 
for Reuters during the war as saying: 
••• it was humilating to look back at what we 
wrote during the war • • • We were a propaganda 
arm of our governments. At the start the cen-
sors enforced that, but by the end we were our 
own censors. We were cheerleaders. I suppose 
there wasn't an alternative at the time. It was 
total war. But for God's sake, let's not glor-ify our role. It wasn't good journalism. It 
wasn't journalism at· all.3 
In his epilogue to his book on John Service, Joseph 
Esherick analyzes the reasons for the failure of the u.s. 
government to "forge a policy of friendship and cooperation 
with the Chinese Communists," and instead to tie ourselves 
to the corrupt KMT. Esherick focsues on the point where 
Roosevelt had capitulated to Chiang's demand to get Stilwell 
out of China, and on Patrick Hurley's emergence as a major 
influence on America's China policy. Service and the other 
members of the American Embassy in Peking had sent Roosevelt 
a telegram urging him to support the CCP, instead of the KMT 
as Hurley had recommended. Before making his decision, Roose-
velt called in Edgar Snow for an interview. The President 
asked Snow if it would be possible for the U.S. to support 
two governments in China. Snow's response was that he him-
self was working as a journalist with both the KMT and the 
CCP. Roosevelt's response, according to Snow, was to say that 
76 
he, too, intended to go on working with both governments until 
a coalition government was achieved. 4 
Roosevelt's subsequent decision to support Chiang· Kai~:s.bek 
exclusively was based on purely military considerations, 
according to Esherick. Unfortunately, even from the military 
view, the decision was wrong. The problem as expressed by 
Esherick was that no one in Washington could appreciate the 
strength of the Communist guerrilla forces. Further, the 
Roosevelt administration was convinced that a KMT-CPP coali-
tion was possible with the CCP a junior partner. Neither 
Embassy personnel nor China journalists could convince Wash-
ington that .full-scale civil war would result from either a 
bogus coalition or a policy of exclusive support for the KMT. 
Nor could they convince Washington that inevitably the CCP 
ld . th t . '1 5 wou w~n a c~v~ war. 
Esherick concludes that with hindsight we now know that 
social and national revolutions are not easily suppressed and 
that the Chinese Communists' ties to Moscow were not unbreak-
able. However it took Korea and Vietnam for that lesson to 
be learned. In the meantime those statesmen and journalists 
who had advocated support for the CCP went through some severe 
repercussions, even though their recommendations had not been 
adopted. Esherick points out that if their recommendations 
had been adopted, and the U.S. had helped bring about a China 
controlled by the Communists,. this would have been unacceptable, 
too. So although we can now say that it might have been better 
to follow the Foreign Service staff and of the "pro-CCP 
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journalists," we only know that now as a result of Korea and 
Vietnam, ne·ither of which may have happened had we followed 
their advice. As Esherick pointed out, only by rejecting 
their advice could there be vindication. 6 
Franklin Roosevelt was neither the first nor the ·last 
president who had to struggle with the press as a persistent 
source of both information and opinions concerning public 
policy. Lyndon Johnson's attitude toward the press was pre-
dominantly negative, and is typical of the way many public 
officials view the press. After a long career in politics, 
he was "gun shy" about journalists; he had seen too many of 
his policies distorted (in his opinion) in the press and had 
seen too much bad news reported while good news was neglected. 
It was Johnson's opinion that journalists generally had inad-
equate backgrounds .in.histary, economics, politics and foreign 
affairs, making it difficult for them to cover complicated 
news stories well. William-Rivers sympathizes with Johnson's 
views as reflections of those held by most public officials 
concerning the press. According to River's definition, the 
function of the press is to act as: 
• • • a broker of official information, gathering 
it from halls of government and disseminating it 
among the people--then carrying their reaction and 
hopes back to_ government.? · 
Rivers implies that while "no function of the press is more 
important," it is one that has built-in problems. It is also 
not the only function. Another, Rivers says, is "to help 
.watch the horizon, much as the ancient messenger once did." 8 
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Watching the horizon, however, has grown from the rather 
simple occupation it was in ancient times to an extremely com-
plicated one involving much more than telling one's superiors 
that someone was coming. American journalists in China had 
the difficult task of observing a very unfamiliar landscape 
full of unfamiliar people under an unusual set of circumstances. 
Their job grew to involve more than straight reporting; they 
sometimes became interpreters as well, and some did come to 
consider themselves as political advisers to their governments 
back home. Because their newsbeat covered territory unfamiliar 
to most readers and to many public officials, these journalists 
tended to consider themselves China experts, and many wrote 
books on the subject as well as articles. Some became obvious 
advocates for one side or the other. Many did try to influence 
foreign policy decisions affecting relations between the u.s. 
and China. While Joseph McCarthy and the China Lobby tried to 
blame the "loss of China" on journalists and diplomats who 
spoke well of the Communists, that irrational assessment is no 
longer given a great deal of credit. 
The whole question of the role of media in politics has 
taken on new dimensions in the 1970s and 1980s as wars have 
been brought into American homes by television cameras. But 
in the 1930s and 1940s there is little evidence to indicate 
that the American press was able to have a significant impact 
on foreign policy decisions concerning China. Some analysts, 
in fact, agree that foreign policy decisions regarding China 
were made without consideration of advice from military, 
political or journalistic observers. As Mark Mancall says 
in his 1984 book, China at the Center • • • 300 Years of 
Foreign.Policy: 
The American errors in China must be, in retro-
spect, an object of wonder. The u.s. had speci-
alists, both in and out of government, who were profoundly experienced in China affairs, and it 
was often well served by its diplomatic and con-
sular personnel in China, but the policy-makers 
would not heed their advice or accept their 
often correct analysis of the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of one or another party.9 
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Mancall's description of U.S.-China relations during the 
months surrounding the 1945 Yalta conference support the view 
that u.s. policy toward China was in serious trouble. The 
State Department had reached a point of "frustration and 
resentment" over its relations with Chiang. Vice-President 
Henry Wallace had rejected the role of middleman between China 
and Russia, and Patrick Hurley's naivete in Moscow "was 
equalled only by his naivete in China." 10 At the very time the 
State Department was refusing to play the role of adviser to 
China in its relations with the Soviet Union, Mancall says, 
the American president in Yalta was agreeing to act as inter-
mediary between the signatory powers and Chiang Kai-shek. 
"Clearly, the U.S. lacked a well-defined policy in China 7 " Man-
call concludes. 11 
Henry Luce involved himself and his publications (Time, 
Life, and Fortune) in the effort to define what form U.S. policy 
should take. A strong advocate of support for Chiang Kai-shek, 
Luce was one journalist who had the political clout to influence 
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politicians. Other journalists such as Snow, Smedley, Strong, 
Belden and others, wrote about KMT corruption and about the 
strengths of the CCP, but their views were not incorporated 
into policy. They were considered by some to be politically 
naive and by others to be radical pro-Communist conspirators. 
Concerning the power of the press among the Chinese 
revolutionaries and the impact of American journalists on 
them, the literature shows Mao Tse-tung as eager to use 
friendly American writers to his advantage whenever possible. 
His response to Snow, Smedley and Strong was positive and 
pragmatic. Analysts such as Pye, Reardan-Anderson, Shew-
maker and Barnett describe Mao's recognition of the impor-
tance of the media in developing.foreign friendships. Their 
analysis indicates that while Mao was successful in befriend-
ing many journalists, the journalists were unable to con-
vince either FDR or Truman that an alliance with Mao would 
be valuable. While the relationship between Mao and American 
journalists was good, then, it had no positive payoff (at 
least not until 20 years later) • More important for Mao and 
his revolution, however, was his success in attracting the 
support of the Chinese·people. That support was adequate to 
carry the revolution to a successful conclusion without 
external support. 
Many political analysts, including Michael Schaller, 
Theodore White, James Burns and Walter Lippmann, agree that 
the American political response to the Chinese revolution 
was calamitous. Burns sees FDR's dream of friendship with 
8J. 
China become a nightmare, and White describes foreign cor-
respondents and Embassy personnel as totally frustrated with 
the political mismanagement. Walter Lippmann blames the 
situation.on the failure of the u.s. to develop a sound ,, 
foreign.policy stance at any time since the turn of the cen-
tury, and Tang Tsou emphasizes that ultimate responsibility 
for the disaster in China belongs to Chiang Kai-shek. It 
was his corruption and inability to attract support from 
among his own people that led to the fall of the KMT and the 
success of the CCP, as well as to the inability of U.S. 
foreign policy (such as it was} to have any impact at all 
• with or without the help of the American press. 
In 1979 a group of noted American journalists and poli-
tical commentators participated in a symposium on the press 
and public policy held in Washington, D.C. George Will and 
Eric Sevareid were among the participants, and one of the 
issues discussed was the significance of the press-policy 
relationship. Sevareid expressed the opinion that the press 
does not often start wars or elect presidents, but it does 
have an effect on policy agendas and political events. From 
time to time, he says, the press functions as an early warn-
ing system. In the early 1930s, he pointed out, the American 
government was not warning this country about the real mean-
ing of Adolph Hitler, but a lot of very good fore.ign corres-
pondents were. The same was true, in Sevareid's opinion, 
during World War II and just before that war began, when: 
• • • the press informed us about the immense 
po.tential of the Chinese Communists and the probabilities of what would happen there. There have been many early warnings from the people of the press; very few that I remember from. government.l2 
Panel member and syndicated columnist George Will 
pointed out that the impact of the media on foreign policy 
has changed significantly since the 1930s simply by virtue 
of the tremendous. growth in American government. The 
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press corps is described by Will as a relatively small col-
lection of. generalists covering an increasingly large army 
of specialists. "The economics of the print medium guaran-
tee that the. government cannot be terribly well covered by 
the 1800 or so daily newspapers in the country," Will 
states. "It may be that a large, centralized, regulated 
welfare state must~ of necessity, be essentially unrepor-
ted. "13 
In discussing the potential power of the press, Mr. 
Will quoted Bertrand Russell's definition of power as "the 
ability to achieve intended effects." When asked if the 
press generally has intentions of manipulating the public, 
Mr. Will says, "Rarely. It's too busy keeping up with the 
flow of events." 14 
Many of the American journalists covering China during 
the 1935-50 period wrote with conviction about what was going 
on there. They did seem to.have intentions of persuading 
.their readers to pay attention to what was going on in China, 
and some clearly wanted to influence American political 
response. However the journalists were divided on the 
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politics of the issue just as policy makers were, and con-
sequently appear to have had little influence on the estab-
lishment of policy. Whatever potential for influence 
existed was overshadowed by other factors and actors in the 
complicated situation. Chinese officials, Mao and Chiang, 
dominated Chinese pol·i tical decisions. American officials, 
(FDR, Truman, Hurley and Marshall) dominated American policy 
decisions. The press undoubtedly was involved in the pro-
cess, but it was only one element in a quite complex process. 
As Frederick Field said in 1937, modern media technology has 
made it possible for public policy to be based on public 
opinion as expressed through the media, but as George Will 
points out, that potential relationship is tempered by the 
extraordinary complexities of today·' s world. 
In view of that growing complexity,. and considering the 
ever more urgent need to make wise political· decisions based 
on accurate information, there is a real need to develop and 
perfect Walter Lippmann's "Machinery of Knowledge." Hope-
fully that machinery will be built cooperatively by those who 
gather information, including journalists, and those who make 
decisions based ·on it, including politicians, so that the 
system will function efficiently. Perhaps in our high-tech 
Information Age a wise and wonderful Knowledge Machine will 
be developed to lower the risk :of disastrous decisions. 
Joseph Klapper concluded after two decades of study 
between 1940 and 1960 that the impact of the media on the 
public's opinions and attitudes was minimal. Developments 
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between the u.s. and China during the 1930s and 1940s indi-
cate that the media also has only a minimal impact on the 
attitudes, opinions and decisions of political leaders. 
Where governments control media, as in China, they do appear 
to demonstrate Karl Deutsch's "steering power" through media 
manipulation. However even in those circumstances that 
power appears _limited~ Such governments can use the media 
as one tool for gaining allegiance, but must use others as 
well. Promises of economic benefits, or threats of negative 
repercussions are two common reinforcing techniques. It 
does appear that in both free and controlled societies, per-
sonal. influences are stronger than the media where both are 
present. 
The major factors concerning developments in China dur-
ing the period in ques.tion had to do with leadership. Mao 
Tse-tung was fighting unscrupulous landlords, reducing rents, 
redistributing land and fighting the Japanese. Chiang Kai-
shek in the meantime was leading a corrupt and inefficient 
government that failed to cope with either critical problems 
at home or the problem of the Japanese. These are the issues 
and events that influenced how the Chinese people responded 
to leadership. u.s. officials responded to issues and events 
also, with a view to doing what would be the most prudent in 
terms of politics, economics and military considerations. 
Politicians appear to have been as-divided in their opinions 
about the China question as the press was, proving Klapper's 
·assessment that media reflects, rather than influences 
political issues. 
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